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Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts,
Procedural Due Process, and Absent
Class Plaintiffs: Minimum Contacts
is Out-Is Individual Notice In?
Introduction
Class actions present tremendous logistical problems for litigants
and courts,' evoking such fearsome images as Frankenstein monsters
2
and dragons.3 The most monstrous problem posed by class suits is en-
suring that the claims of the absent class members are adjudicated in
accordance with the requirements of due process.4 While some proce-
dural protections are necessary to assure due process, other procedures,
most notably individual notice, may be so expensive that they altogether
preclude maintenance of the suit and the possiblity of any recovery.'
1. The paradigm of class action rules is the current federal rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 23,
which has complex prerequisites to certification, see generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1759-71 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER], and distinct subdivisions under which a class suit can be certified. See infra note 72.
Aside from the initial certification difficulties, one of the most complex logistical problems is
providing notice to absent members. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 299 (1972); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, at §§ 1785-97.
2. Judge Lumbard characterized one case as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class
action." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 55, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J. dissent-
ing). Justice Powell cited the phrase with apparent approval in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 169 (1974); see also Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARv. L. REV. 664 (1979).
3. Two often-cited commentaries, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1318 (1976), and Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 609 (1971), are introduced with a quote by Justice Holmes:
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can
count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is
only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a
useful animal.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897) (Address at Boston Univer-
sity School Of Law, Jan. 8, 1897).
4. See generally Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions: "Playing Fair" With Na-
tional Classes, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1487 (1984); Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate:
Due Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1975);
McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Sub-
stance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1351 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 158 (1974); see also Shaman, Notice
Requirements in State Court Class Actions: The Aftermath of Eisen, 4 CLASS ACTION REP. 195
(1975) ("By placing so heavy a financial burden upon class actions, the [individual notice
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Generally, procedural due process is invoked to safeguard the de-
fendant's interests in traditional, nonrepresentative actions.6 In these
cases, due process requires minimum contacts between the defendant and
the forum state,7 and prejudgment notice of the action to the defendant.8
When the proper procedures are followed, the forum court can exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant and proceed to a judgment which has full
binding effect in subsequent actions initiated by either the defendant or
the plaintiff.'
Due process takes on an added dimension in class suits. The nature
of the typical class action-a suit against a single defendant by represent-
atives of a large class of plaintiffs-requires that due process protections
be provided to the absent class plaintiffs,10 as well as to the defendant.
Traditionally, due process has required that class representatives both
adequately represent the interests of the class and provide a notice
scheme advising the class members of the action. 1  More recently, some
courts have also required minimum contacts between nonresident absent
class members and the forum state as a prerequisite to entering a judg-
ment binding on the class. 12 These procedural protections-adequate
representation, prejudgment notice, and minimum contacts-have gener-
ated debate within the legal community13 and a diversity of court
decisions. 4
Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts15 embodies the United States
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the procedural protec-
tions available to absent class plaintiffs. In Shutts a class action was liti-
gated under the Kansas class action rule. 16 The class representatives
provided individual notice to the absent plaintiffs-most of whom were
not Kansas residents-and the trial court certified a class consisting of.
requirement] enervates the effectiveness of large class actions as a means of redressing legal
wrongs that net billions of dollars for the wrongdoers and cause untold damage to innocent
individuals as well as to the public interest.").
6. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. See, eg., World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914).
9. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 718 (1877). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4401-78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
10. See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at §§ 1785-97.
11. See infra notes 53-97 and accompanying text.
12. See, eg., Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (App. Div.
1976) (applying the minimum contacts doctrine and denying certification of a class action).
13. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
15. 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
16. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (1983).
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persons who received notice and did not opt out of the suit.17 The de-
fendant, Phillips, raised the due process concerns of the absent plain-
tiffs.18 Phillips argued that the opt out procedure was insufficient to
confer jurisdiction over the absent nonresident plaintiffs, and that the
Kansas courts could enter a binding judgment only over the absent plain-
tiffs who had "minimum contacts"19 with Kansas, or who affirmatively
consented to jurisdiction by opting into the suit. 0 Phillips also raised a
conflicts of law argument on which the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the judgment.21
In resolving the controversy, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the
requirement of minimum contacts between nonresident class plaintiffs
and the forum state, holding that a forum court can exercise jurisdiction
over a class suit when the absent class plaintiffs are provided with mini-
mal procedural protections of adequate representation, notice, and the
opportunity to opt out of the litigation.2 The Supreme Court upheld the
opt out notice scheme authorized by the Kansas rule, specifically re-
jecting Phillips' argument that due process requires nonresident, absent
class plaintiffs to affirmatively opt into the suit before the state court can
exercise jurisdiction over them. 3 In dicta, however, the Court implied
17. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
18. An interesting aspect of class suits is the apparent role reversal by the participants.
Defendants raise the due process rights of the absent plaintiffs in an effort to prevent certifica-
tion, while the named plaintiffs mimimize their class' due process concerns in an effort to
certify the largest class possible. See, eg., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965
(1985); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In addition to generating larger
attorney fees and encouraging beneficial settlements, larger plaintiff classes help to bring about
the recognized benefits of class suits-judicial economy by consolidating numerous individual
actions into one suit, Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2974, and effective access to courts for holders of
claims which would be uneconomical to pursue individually. Id.; see also McCall, supra note
4, at 1355.
19. For a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, minimum contacts must
exist between the forum state and the defendant. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945); see also World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
20. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2970. See infra notes 33, 109-112 and accompanying text.
21. Phillips' argument centered on the application of Kansas law, particularly its interest
rates, to all of the claims of the class members, including the majority (97%) of the members
who were residents of states with significantly lower interest rates. In sustaining Phillips' argu-
ment, the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause place
"modest" restrictions on the application of forum law: "IF]or a State's substantive law to be
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2978-79 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)). The Court also rejected the contention that maintenance
of a class suit afforded Kansas more latitude to apply its law to the entire action. Id. at 2980.
The Court did not, however, hold that the law of each class member's State must be applied;
rather it implied that Kansas would have to augment its justification for its choice of law
decision. Id. at 2981.
22. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
23. Id.
Summer 19861 CLASS ACTIONS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
that a nonresident class member's failure to respond to the individual
notice was tantamount to consent to the court's jurisdiction.24 Because
of this dicta, future class action defendants will likely argue that under
Shutts, due process requires individual notice to absent class plaintiffs in
all common question class actions.
This Comment discusses the extent of notice which is constitution-
ally required in common question class actions. Part One describes the
facts of Shutts and the Court's decision. Part Two examines the necessity
of providing procedural protections to absent class plaintiffs and reviews
the procedural requirements laid down in a trilogy of Supreme Court
decisions applicable to class suits. Part Three offers various interpreta-
tions of the notice holding in Shutts, and Part Four argues that under
Shutts due process requires a notice scheme in all class suits, but does not
require individual notice to every absent class member.
I. Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts
In Shutts, owners of gas leases26 brought suit against their lessee,
Phillips, claiming accrued interest on royalties withheld by Phillips pend-
ing administrative approval of an increase in consumer gas prices.2 7
Upon certification of a class of approximately 33,000 plaintiffs,28 the rep-
resentatives mailed a notice of the action to each class member.29 The
final class consisted of three class representatives and 28,100 absent class
members. The court excluded from the final class 3,400 royalty owners
who had opted out of the litigation and an additional 1,500 members
whose notices could not be delivered.3° Judgment was entered for the
class and affirmed by the Kansas Supreme Court over Phillips' claim that
24. See infra notes 41, 109-112 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 38, 104-105.
26. The named representatives were In Shutts, a resident of Kansas, and Robert and
Betty Anderson, residents of Oklahoma. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2969.
27. Under regulations promulgated by the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission), Phillips was required to secure approval for any increases in
natural gas prices it charged customers, but was allowed to propose and collect the higher
prices subject to final approval by the Commission. Phillips did not, however, remit the in-
creases to its leaseholders until final approval, and the lessors sued in Shutts to collect interest
on the increased revenues for the period they were withheld. Id.
28. Class members resided in all fifty states, the District of Columbia and foreign nations,
and the leases were located in eleven states, but principally in Texas. Id. at 2968, 2977 n.6.
29. . The Court summarized the notice provided to the absent class members:
The notice described the action and informed each class member that he could ap-
pear in person or by counsel; otherwise each member would be represented by... the
named plaintiffs. The notices also stated that class members would be included in the
class and bound by the judgment unless they "opted out" of the lawsuit by executing
and returning a "request for exclusion" that was included with the notice.
Id. at 2969.
30. Id.
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the due process rights of the absent plaintiffs were violated.31 Phillips
argued that the Kansas courts did not have jurisdiction over the absent
class plaintiffs and therefore could not enter a judgment that could bind
them.32 Phillips further contended that unless the absent plaintiffs af-
firmatively consented to jurisdiction by "opting into" the suit, the court
could exercise jurisdiction only over nonresident plaintiffs who had mini-
mum' contacts with Kansas under International Shoe Company v. Wash-
ington33 and its progeny.
The first issue presented by Shutts was whether a defendant could
raise the due process concerns of the absent class plaintiffs. The Court
held that Phillips had standing to raise these potential claims, because
Phillips had a "distinct and personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff
class bound by res judicata just as [Phillips] is bound."34 The Court reit-
erated that judicial economy and fairness to the party opposing the class
requires an inquiry by the trial court into the binding effect of a class
judgment, and allowed Phillips to initiate this inquiry:
The only way a class action defendant like [Phillips] can assure
itself of this binding effect of the judgment is to ascertain that the
forum court has jurisdiction over every plaintiff whose claim it
seeks to adjudicate, sufficient to support a defense of res judicata in
a later suit for damages by class members.35
Although the Court allowed Phillips to raise the due process claims
of the absent plaintiffs, it rejected Phillips' jurisdictional arguments. In
rejecting the minimum contacts argument, the Court acknowledged that
due process protections vary depending upon the perceived needs of the
parties.36 While the minimum contacts doctrine was designed to address
the concerns of out-of-state defendants, the Court noted that absent class
plaintiffs have unique concerns which require unique procedural safe-
guards.37 The Court ruled that a state court can bind absent class plain-
tiffs to a judgment for money damages" if it provides the absent parties
the minimal procedural protections of adequate representation, notice of
the action, and an opportunity to opt out of the litigation.39
31. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984).
32. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2970.
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also, World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
34. Shutns, 105 S. Ct. at 2972.
35. Id..
36. Id. at 2973.
37. Id. at 2974 (these safeguards include judicial "inquiry into the common nature of the
named plaintiff's and the absent plaintiffs' claims, the adequacy of representation ... and
[restrictions against] dismiss[al] or compromise[ ] without the approval of the court.").
38. The Court stressed that its decision applies only to certain class suits: "Our holding
today is limited to those class actions which seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims
wholly or predominately for money judgments." Id. at 2975 n.3.
39. Id. at 2975.
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The Court also rejected Phillips' contention that the absent class
plaintiffs must affirmatively consent to jurisdiction by "opting into" the
litigation.' Although the Court rejected the opt in requirement, it im-
plied that the absent Shutts plaintiffs in effect had consented to jurisdic-
tion by failing to opt out of the litigation: "Any plaintiff may consent to
jurisdiction .... The essential question, then, is how stringent the re-
quirement for a showing of consent will be."4 In the Court's view, the
Shutts opt out scheme was not merely pro forma because 3,400 lease
holders had opted out of the suit.42 The Court also noted that an "opt
in" procedure urged by Phillips as a constitutional safeguard would in-
validate the federal class action rule and a score of state rules.4 3
The Court ruled that Kansas' notice procedure "satisfie[d]" due
process and held that the Kansas courts properly exercised jurisdiction in
Shutts.4 However, the basis of the Court's holding is unclear. The
Court may have relied upon one of three theories: the unique procedural
safeguards that render traditional due process concepts inapplicable in
class suits; the notice actually utililized in the Shutts litigation, and the
absent class members' ability to opt out of the litigation; or the sugges-
tion that the absent class members may have consented to jurisdiction.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2975-76 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 2976.
43. Id. Currently the majority of the state class action rules are modeled after the revised
federal rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 23: ALA. R. Civ. P. 23; ARiz. R. Civ. P. 23, ARK. R. Civ. P. 23-
23.2; COLO. R. Civ. P. 23; CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 52 (as amended and renumbered §§ 86-90
(1975)); DEL. CH. Cr. R. 23; D.C. SUPER. Cr. R. Civ. P. 23; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220; HAWAII
R. Civ. P. 23; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 23; ILL. R. Civ. P. §§ 57.2-57.7 (1977); IND. R. TRIAL P. 23;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (1983); Ky. R. Civ. P. 23; ME. R. Civ. P. 23; MICH. GEN. Cr. R.
3.501; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23; Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08; MONT. R. Civ. P. 23; NEv. R. Civ. P. 23;
N.J. R. Civ. P. 4.32; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976); OHIO R. CIV. P.
23; 12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2023-2023.2 (Supp. 1984-85); OR. R. Civ. P. 32; PA. R. Civ. P.
1701-1716; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-23 (1969); TENN. R. Civ. P. 23; TEX. R. Civ.
P. 42; UTAH R. Civ. P. 23; VT. R. Civ. P. 23; WASH. Cr. R. 23; Wyo. R. Civ. P. 23. All but
Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Texas and Utah have opt
out provisions. See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2976 n.5. The remainder of the state rules are
modeled on the original federal rule or the Field Code version, see infra note 82. Original Rule
23 versions are ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23; GA. CODE ANN. § 81-A-123 (Supp. 1967); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 591-597 (West 1960); N.M. R. Civ. P. 23; W.VA. R. Civ. P. 23.
The Field Code versions are CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973) (California also
has a consumer class action statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West 1983)); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-319 (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21.1-1 (1938); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, 15-5-50 (Law.
Co-op. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 803.08 (1976).
Two states have enacted the Uniform Class Action Rule: IOWA R. CIv. P. 42.1-42-20;
N.D. R. CIV. P. 23. Mississippi, New Hampshire and Virginia have no formal class action
rules (however Mississippi permits costs and attorney fees in successful class suits. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-53-37 (1942)).
44. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2976.
45. Id. at 2977.
II. Due Process and Absent Class Members
The starting point in a discussion of the procedural due process re-
quirements necessary to maintain a class suit is to identify the specific
interests being protected. The chose in action of an absent class plaintiff
is a property interest46 which may consist of a claim for declaratory re-
lief 7 or a claim for damages.48 Damage claims may range from de
minimis taxi cab overcharges,49 to considerable wrongful death claims.5 0
In each case, the property interest of the absent class plaintiff is litigated
by another plaintiff, and the Constitution requires that the absent plain-
tiff's claim not be foreclosed without observing due process." If due
process is observed, the court may proceed to a judgment which will be
binding on the absent class members.52
Three Supreme Court decisions detail the procedural protections
necessary in class actions. In Hansberry v. Lee,53 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the representative suit and laid down the requirement
of adequate representation as a prerequisite to entering a binding class
judgment.54 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company,55
the Court determined the necessity and extent of prejudgment notice in
representative suits, and in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,56 the Court re-
quired individual notice in common question class suits maintained pur-
suant to the federal class action rule.57
Hansberry involved the res judicata effect of a judgment in a prior
class suit.58 The defendants disputed the court's power to enter a judg-
46. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2973; see Note, Developments in The Law-Class Actions 89
HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1404 (1976) (discussing whether a particular chose in action is a "prop-
erty interest" amenable to due process protections).
47. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
48. See, eg., Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted, 456
U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
49. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967).
50. See, eg., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. Stover, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
51. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.... .") (emphasis added); U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("No State shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .. ") (emphasis
added).
52. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940). See generally 7A C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1786, 1789 (Supp. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE]; 3 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS Ac-
TIONS §§ 16.20-16.24 (2d ed. 1985); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4455.
53. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
54. Id. at 42-43.
55. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
56. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
57. Id. at 176-77.
58. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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ment binding against them when they were not parties to the prior suit,
nor successors in interest or in privity with the parties." The Supreme
Court rejected this broad attack on the class action device, recognizing
the need for a class or representative suit when the number of interested
parties is too great to allow for joinder.60 The Court set out the princi-
ples for rendering a binding class judgment:
In such cases where the interests of those not joined are of the same
class as the interests of those who are, and where it is considered
that the latter fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the
litigation of the issues in which all have a common interest, the
court will proceed to a decree....
[T]here has been a failure of due process only in those cases
where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures
the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound
by it....
[M]embers of a class not present as parties to the litigation
may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately
represented by parties who are present.61
Because it was evident that the named plaintiffs in the prior class
suit did not represent the interests of the defendants in Hansberry,62 the
Court held that the previous judgment was not binding upon them.63
Finding the representation clearly inadequate, the Court failed to specify
the elements of adequate representation; nor did the Court determine
whether additional safeguards were necessary."
Subsequent decisions elaborating the concept of adequate represen-
tation have required certifying courts to examine the motivations of the
class representatives, their financial ability to fully litigate the claims, and
the competency of their counsel.65 Additionally, the adequacy of the
class representation is subject to ongoing review throughout the litiga-
59. Id. at 38.
60. Id. at 41.
61. Id. at 41-43 (citations omitted).
62. The original class suit was instituted to declare the validity of a racially restrictive
covenant, whereas the defendants in Hansberry, who were nominal members of the plaintiff
class, disputed the covenant's validity and arranged for the sale of a home in violation of the
covenant. Id. at 37-39.
63. Id. at 44.
64. Id. at 43-44.
65. The existence of strike suits caused a great deal of concern with early class actions.
See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters, supra note 2. Critics claimed that without adequate
supervision, plaintiff's counsel tended to settle the claims for large fees, but without adequate
compensation to the absent plaintiff class. Court review of attorney fees and settlement agree-
ments were designed to meet these problems. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE,
supra note 52, at §§ 1761, 1764-70; 1 NEWBERG, supra note 52, at §§ 5.01-5.15. The current
rules have incorporated protections against strike suits by codifying these protections. See,
e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1967).
tion.66 Adequate representation is a prerequisite to certification in virtu-
ally all of the class action rules currently in force67 and is the paramount
procedural due process safeguard available to absent class plaintiffs.68
Adequate representation effectively protects absent class members' inter-
ests by giving the courts a focal point for their certification determina-
tions, and affording the absent parties a means for attacking the
judgment if it is adverse to their interests.69 Adequate representation,
coupled with the common safeguards of court review of settlement agree-
ments70 and attorney fees,7" assure that the absent plaintiffs' interests are
fully litigated. Indeed, these are the only protections expressly provided
to absent plaintiffs in class suits where notice is discretionary.72
However, most class action rules in force also expressly require pre-
judgment notice in common question class suits.73 The notice require-
ment arises principally from the case of Mullane v. Central Hanover
66. See, eg., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973) (Plaintiff successfully
collaterally attacked a class judgment by arguing that the representative failed to continue to
adequately represent his interests by not appealing the nonretroactivity of a favorable judg-
ment. The Fifth Circuit outlined a two-part test for reviewing the adequacy of representation:
"(I) Did the trial court in the first suit correctly determine, initially, that the representative
would adequately represent the class? and (2) Does it appear, after the termination of the suit,
that the class representative adequately protected the interest of the class?").
67. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975; Paulino v. Hardister, 306 So. 2d 125, 128 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App, 1974); see generally 1 NEWBERG, supra note 52, at § 1.06; 7 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1765; 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
% 23.07 (1985). But see In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 657 (W.D.
Okla. 1973) (Court refused to consider the adequacy of the representation where the absent
class member received opt out notice and failed to respond). See generally Note, Collateral
Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARv. L. REV. 589 (1974).
69. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
70. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court."); see also supra note 65.
71. See 3 NEWBERG, supra note 52, at § 16.13; Homburger, State Class Actions and the
Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 647-51 (1971); see also supra note 65.
72. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b). The federal rule has three subdivisions under which
class suits may be maintained: (I) the "anti-prejudice" classes, in which individual suits would
create the risk that the party opposing the class would be faced with inconsistent judgments, or
where individual suits would be dispositive of absent persons' interests, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1) (see generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at §§ 1772-74); (2) the "injunc-
tion" classes, in which the class is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief or the plaintiff is
attempting to enjoin conduct by a defendant class, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (see generally 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at §§ 1775-76); and (3) the "common question" classes, in
which common questions of law or fact predominate over questions concerning the individual
class members, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (see generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1,
at §§ 1777-84). Notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) suits is discretionary, while notice in (b)(3) suits is
mandatory. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
73. E.g, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) ("In any class action maintained under subdivision
(b)(3) [the "common questions" or damages subdivision] the court shall direct to the members
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances.") (emphasis added).
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Bank & Trust Company,74 decided a decade after Hansberry. Mullane
was not a class action; instead it involved an application for an account-
ing by the trustee of a common trust fund. The interests of the trust
beneficiaries were represented by a guardian ad litem, and the only notice
provided to the beneficiaries was publication in local newspapers. 75 The
representative argued that this notice violated the beneficiaries' due pro-
cess rights, and the Supreme Court agreed:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at
a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case....
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportu-
nity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature
as reasonably to convey the required information ... and it must
afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance.76
The Court found that the constructive notice utilized in Mullane
was insufficient not because it failed to reach every beneficiary, but be-
cause, under the circumstances, individual notice was a reasonably avail-
able alternative.7 However, the Court also indicated that under certain
circumstances, less than individual notice would satisfy due process:
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests.
The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with
that of a class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund and
the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries.
Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested
in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objec-
tion sustained would inure to the benefit of all.78
Although Mullane was not a class action, it was a form of represen-
tative suit and its holding applies to modern class actions. Prejudgment
notice safeguards the absent parties' interests by allowing them a timely
means of objecting to litigation ostensibly filed on their behalf. These
objections allow the court to determine whether the representatives are
74. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
75. Id. at 309-10.
76. Id. at 313-14 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 319. The Court pointed out that the trustee individually communicated with
the beneficiaries upon establishing the common trust fund and when remitting their income,
and that individual notice would not unduly interfere with the maintenance of the suit or
frustrate the legitimate state interest in rendering a final accounting of the fund.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
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indeed acting on behalf of the purported class. Thus, Mullane essentially
assigns notice a role of supplementing and ensuring the adequacy of the
representation.
Although prejudgment notice is a requirement in the majority of
class action rules, the extent of notice required is not uniform.7 9 Most
class action rules distinguish between the various types of class suits.
Suits claiming injunctive relief and suits against a limited fund typically
have discretionary notice provisions, while suits principally for damages
and based only on common questions of law or fact typically have
mandatory notice provisions. 0 The extent of notice constitutionally re-
quired in common question class suits remains unanswered.
The Supreme Court discussed this issue in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin,81 which involved the certification of a common question class ac-
tion under the current federal class action rule.82 By literally applying
79. See supra notes 43, 51-52 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 51-52. The federal rule allows for discretionary notice in nondamage
class actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).
81. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The current rule is the culmination of various attempts to codify
the class action device. Indeed, the history of the federal codification reveals the problems
generated by a device which endeavors to bind parties not before the court. Codification began
in 1842 with Federal Equity Rule 48:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in
its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the
suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the
plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in such cases, the
decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of the absent parties.
(quoted in 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1751) (emphasis added). Despite the last
sentence, the Supreme Court found the judgment binding on absent parties in Smith v. Sworm-
stedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
Equity Rule 48 was replaced with a more concise rule, Federal Equity Rule 38, in 1912:
"When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the whole." The new rule omitted the reference to the binding effects of a
class judgment, and as a result, there was uncertainty about the binding effect of a class judg-
ment. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1751. However, in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), the Supreme Court "left little doubt as to its belief in the
desirability of binding unnamed members of a class." 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at
§ 1751, p. 509.
Class actions affording legal relief were authorized in 1938 with the promulgation of Orig-
inal Rule 23, FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) (amended 1966). The rule divided class actions into
categories which came to be known as "true", "hybrid" and "spurious". See generally 7
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1752. The spurious category concerned actions involv-
ing "a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is
sought." FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) (amended 1966). Spurious actions were not binding upon
absent parties, and this led to the practice of one-way intervention. The absent party could
take advantage of a favorable judgment but was not bound by an adverse judgment.
The most recent effort at federal codification is the Revised Rule 23, FED. R. Civ. P. 23,
which has categories roughly analogous to those in the original rule but which are based on the
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Mullane and strictly interpreting the federal rule, the Eisen Court held
that individual notice must be sent to "all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort."'8 3 Although the Court acknowledged that the
costs of such a requirement would have the effect of terminating the ac-
tion and precluding many similar actions,84 the Court insisted that such
individual notice be provided.
The Eisen decision generated considerable debate as to whether the
decision was based on an interpretation of Rule 23 or on the Due Process
Clause.8" If Eisen were a due process decision, its notice holding would
have been applicable to state actions. If Eisen were a rule decision, state
courts would have been free to develop their own interpretations as to the
applicability of Mullane to common question class suits. A number of
states concluded that Eisen was a rule decision and rejected an inflexible
requirement of individual notice in all common question class actions.86
While accepting the principle that notice is a necessary element of due
process which is required in class actions, these courts retained discretion
as to the type of notice required in a given case.87 Circumstances consid-
subject matter of the claims and relief sought, rather than the jural relationships between the
class members. A principal aim of the drafters of the Revised Rule was to ensure that class
judgments were binding on all class members. Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99
(1966); see also Kaplan, supra note 65.
Currently, the Revised Rule is the model for the majority of the state class action statutes
and the Uniform Class Action Rule, UNIF. CLAss ACTION [AcT][RuLE], 12 U.L.A. 26 (Supp.
1985).
State codification of class actions originally began in the mid 1800's, commencing in 1849
with an amendment to the Field code of New York. The Field Code version was the predeces-
sor to Federal Equity Rule 38, and stated: "When the question is one of common or general
interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole." 1849
N.Y. LAWS ch. 438 § 119. For a complete list of the state rules currently in force, see supra
note 43.
83. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 177.
84. Id. at 176.
85. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 52, at § 1786; 3 NEWBERG,
supra note 52, at § 13.20; Shaman, Notice Requirments in State Court Class o4ctions: The After-
math of Eisen, 4 CLASS ACTION REP. 195 (1975) (advocating interpreting Eisen as a rule
decision, but arguing that neither the rule nor due process requires individual notice).
86. See, e.g., Ray v. Midland Grace Trust Co. 35 N.Y.2d 147, 316 N.E.2d 320, 359
N.Y.D.2d 28 (1974); Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975);
see also 3 NEWBERG, supra note 52, at § 13.20.
87. See, e.g., Frank v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 71 111. 2d 83, 592-93, 376 N.E.2d
1377, 1381-82 (1978):
While the courts ... differ as to whether the result in Eisen was predicated upon
Federal Rule 23(c)(2) ... or based upon due process considerations, this court has
recognized that although "notice to absent class members as it relates to due process
was discussed in Eisen, that constitutional requirement was not the basis of the Eisen
decision." (citations omitted)... We [have] also noted.., that due process does not
require individual notice to every member of the class in all circumstances.... Due
process considerations come into play, of course, because in class action litigation all
members of the class are bound by the result. Where it is apparent that there may be
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ered by courts in determining the type of notice required in a given case
include the cohesiveness of the class, the size of the claims, the likelihood
of relitigation, the expected cost of individual notice and the desirability
of maintaining the action.88
In Cartt v. Superior Court,8 9 a California court of appeals took a
unique approach to notice requirements by adopting two distinct notice
standards. The first was the extent of notice required to maintain the
action initially, and the second, possibly more rigorous standard, was the
extent of notice required to preclude relitigation of the issues by absent
class members.90 Although the court's approach was reasonable in that
it accounts for the plaintiff's administrative problems in providing pre-
judgment notice,91 it fails to consider the interests of the party opposing
the class. Because the Shutts decision reiterates the necessity of assuring
that a class judgment is binding on all class members prior to certifica-
tion of the suit,92 it is doubtful that the Cartt approach would be sus-
tained after Shutts.
State courts were not alone in rejecting Eisen as a due process deci-
sion. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws rejected its holding in
their draft of the Uniform Class Action Rule.93 The Uniform Rule takes
a flexible approach to notice and requires individual notice to absent
plaintiffs with claims of $100 or more.94 To date, the Uniform Rule has
been enacted by Iowa and North Dakota.95 The American Law Institute
also rejected a requirement of individual notice in representative suits:
"A person represented by a party to an action is bound by the judgment
even though the person himself does not have notice of the action, is not
served with process, or is not subject to service of process."96 In addition,
the legislatures of California and New York rejected mandatory individ-
differing interests among class members or differing opinions as to the desirability of
the relief requested in the complaint, those persons who may object have a right to be
notified of its pendency so that they may take such actions as they deem appropriate
to the protection of their interests.
88. See, eg., Frank, 71 Ill. 2d at 593, 376 N.E.2d at 1381 (allowing less than individual
notice stating, "[t]o the degree there is cohesiveness within the class, the need for notice to
absent members will, of course, tend toward a minimum .... ); Cartt v. Superior Court, 50
Cal. App. 3d 960, 973, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 385 (1975) (finding individual notice unnecessary
where "[tihe class is huge, the damages per member trifling and the financial burden of the
notice ordered by the ... court entirely out of proportion to its beneficial results.").
89. 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
90. Id. at 965, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
91. Id. at 973, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
92. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2972.
93. UNIF. CLASS AcTION [AcT][RULE], 12 U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 1985).
94. Id. at § 7.
95. IowA R. Civ. P. 42.1-42.20 (adopted 1980); N.D. R. Civ. P. 23 (adopted 1976).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(2) (1980). Section 41 is qualified by
the following:
(1) A person is not bound by a judgment for or against a party who purports to
represent him if: (a) Notice concerning the representation was required to be given
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ual notice in their class action statutes.97
Class action defendants' attempts to apply the minimum contacts
doctrine to nonresident class plaintiffs is of more recent vintage. The
argument arises from the Supreme Court's decision in World- Wide Volk-
swagon Corporation v. Woodson,98 which indicated that the minimum
contacts doctrine had federalism underpinnings as well as providing due
process protections to out of state defendants. 99 Class action defendants
have argued that trial courts cannot reach beyond their borders and bind
class plaintiffs without exceeding the scope of their own state's sover-
eignty."° Generally, state courts have rejected this argument.10' Shutts
is the first Supreme Court decision squarely dealing with the argument,
and it too rejects the applicability of the minimum contacts doctrine to
absent class plaintiffs. I°2
III. Interpretations of Shutts
In one respect, Shutts encourages the maintenance of multistate
class actions by clearly declaring the minimum contacts standard inap-
plicable to absent class plaintiffs and by approving the opt out procedures
authorized by most of the current rules. But the Court's language gives
rise to interpretations which actually may limit the effective use of class
actions, particularly multistate class suits.
to the represented person, or others who might act to protect his interest, and there
was no substantial compliance with the requirement ....
Id., at § 42. However, the commentators reject the proposition that individual notice is a
prerequisite to binding absent parties to a judgment in a representative suit:
With respect to Federal Rule 23 and similar rules governing class suits, the queston
of what, under the circumstances of the case, constitutes adequate notice to the rep-
resented class is itself a matter of some uncertainty.... That question is beyond the
scope of this Restatement. The rule of paragraph (1)(a) deals with the situation that
arises when the required notice, whatever it might be, was not given.
Id., at § 42 comment b (citations omitted).
97. Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985) (al-
lowing notice by publication "if personal notification is unreasonably expensive ..... Id., at
§ 1781(d)); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976) (allowing judicial discretion
to "send[ ] notice to a random sample of the class." Id., at § 904c(III)).
98. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
99. Id. at 291-94.
100. See, e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cerL
denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978) (a successful prior class action commenced by Mr. Shutts for
interest on suspended royalties from leaseholds located in Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma dur-
ing the years 1961-70; referred to as "Shutts I'); see also, Note, Civil Procedure-Class Action
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Plaintiffs-Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Company ("Shutts 1",
33 U. KAN. L. Rv. 525 (1985).
101. See, e.g., Shuttsl, 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977); Horst v. Guy, 211 N.W.2d 723
(N.D. 1973).
102. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2973.
CLASS ACTIONS
A. Individual Notice
The first ambiguity in Shutts arises from the fact that the class repre-
sentatives provided individual notice to each member of the certified
class. This fact could be read as integral to the Court's decision or as
merely an incidental fact. The Court stated:
The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard
and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through
counsel. The notice must be the best practicable, "reasonably cal-
culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." Mullane ... ; c.f Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacqueline .... The notice should describe the action and the
plaintiffs' rights in it. Additionally, we hold that due process re-
quires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an
opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and re-
turning an "opt out" or "request for exclusion" form to the
court. 103
The most expansive reading of this holding is that individual notice
must be given to all absent plaintiffs in all common question class suits.
Another plausible interpretation is that Shutts requires individual notice
to nonresident class plaintiffs but not to class plaintiffs residing in the
forum state. It is likely that defendants in class suits will press one of
these interpretations to prevent the certification of large classes of plain-
tiffs because of the expense of individual notice. If, however, Shutts is
read as a whole and in context with prior Supreme Court decisions on
class actions, the legitimate interpretation of Shutts is more limited: the
decision merely rejects the applicability of the minimum contacts doc-
trine, requires the ability to opt out of common question class actions,
and requires a notice scheme-but not necessarily individual notice.
The notice holding may be interpreted as requiring individual notice
to all absent plaintiffs in all common question class actions. The opinion
states that absent plaintiffs must have the opportunity to opt out of the
suit by returning an opt out or request for exclusion "form" to the
court.' °4 In support of its notice holding, the Court cites Eisen-where
individual notice was mandated-as analogous; 05 in addition, the Court
stated that absent class plaintiffs must "receive" notice. 10 6
Although Shutts promotes the ability to opt out to constitutional
dimensions, it does not necessarily follow that individual notice is re-
quired. The issue in Shutts was whether the opt out procedure author-
ized by the Kansas class action rule violated the due process rights of the
absent class plaintiffs, and the Court held only that, at a minimum, due
103. Id. at 2975.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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process requires adequate representation and the ability to opt out of the
litigation. The required method for providing adequate notice and the
opportunity to opt out was not at issue, nor definitively ruled upon by the
Court. Further, the Court quoted Mullane, and stated that absent class
plaintiffs must receive the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances. 107 Other courts relying on the same language in Mullane have
rejected an individual notice requirement. °10
Although the Court stated that absent plaintiffs must be able to re-
turn a "form" to the certifying court, Shutts does not require that the
form be supplied by individual notice. Such a form could easily be made
available through publication in newspapers and magazines. The perti-
nent aspect of the opt out holding is the ability to opt out of the litigation,
not a required method for doing so.
Undoubtedly the Shutts Court was aware of the debate generated by
Eisen, and thus its failure to categorically state that individual notice is a
due process requirement is significant. The absence of a clear statement
requiring individual notice should be interpreted as an intentional omis-
sion: the Court did not make such a statement because due process does
not require individual notice in all circumstances.
B. Notice As Consent
More significant, perhaps, is the implication in Shutts that the opt
out notice scheme established that each nonresident class member in ef-
fect consented to jurisdiction. If Shutts requires consent by each nonresi-
dent class member, and if receipt of notice establishes consent, then
arguably Shutts requires, at a minimum, individual notice to nonresident
class members. On this interpretation, the failure to opt out after receipt
of individual notice would be the specific act by which consent could be
determined.109 If notice is elevated to the role of establishing consent to
jurisdiction, then non-receipt of notice would be tantamount to a lack of
jurisdiction.
However, this elevated role of notice is not mandated by the specific
language or the basic rationale of the Court's decision. The consent dis-
cussion can be read as responding to Phillips' contention that opt out
procedures are insufficient to establish consent. The Court did not hold
that the absent class plaintiffs must consent to jurisdiction as a prerequi-
site to maintaining a common question class action; rather, in dicta, the
Court showed that such a procedure, under certain circumstances, can
establish consent. The important point is that the Court upheld the indi-
vidual opt out procedure utilized in the case by twice stating that such a
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
109. The Shutts Court emphasized that only those persons whose notices were actually
delivered were included in the class. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2969, 2976.
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procedure "satisifies" due process;1"' it did not state that due process
requires such a procedure.
The notice-as-consent interpretation is inconsistent with the tenor of
Shutts, and, if accepted, would raise difficult and novel issues for the
courts. If the role of notice is to establish consent to jurisdiction by non-
resident class plaintiffs, it apparently would be unnecessary to provide
notice to resident plaintiffs, where traditional notions of territorial juris-
diction exist.111 However, the Shutts Court clearly held that some type
of notice to class members-the best practicable under the circum-
stances-is required. 1 2
An individual notice interpretation of Shutts would not facially in-
validate the majority of class action rules which contain discretionary
notice provisions, but it would, however, overturn a decade of thoughtful
decisions by various state courts 13 and invalidate the consumer class ac-
tion statutes of California and New York. 1 4 It would also invalidate the
Uniform Class Action Rule as enacted by Iowa and North Dakota. 15
Indeed, an individual notice requirement could be the death knell for
many consumer class actions because of its prohibitive costs. 6
IV. The Better Interpretation
Read in context, Shutts should be interpreted as holding that due
process requires a notice scheme in all class action suits, but that the
scheme need not rely on individual notice. This interpretation enables
class actions to provide the benefits for which they were developed, while
simultaneously securing ample protection for the rights of absent class
plaintiffs.
The thrust of Shutts supports a flexible notice requirement. The un-
derlying rationale for the Court's rejection of the minimum contacts doc-
trine in class suits is that due process is a flexible concept. The Court
illustrated this by contrasting the concerns of out-of-state defendants
with those of absent class plaintiffs. The Court mentioned that absent
class plaintiffs have protections unique to class suits." 7 Significant
among these protections is one created by Shutts itself: the defendant
can raise the due process concerns of the absent plaintiffs. By emphasiz-
ing that it is in the defendant's interest to assure a binding class judg-
ment, and giving the defendant standing to raise potential claims of the
110. Id. at 2976.
111. See generally 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, at § 1064.
112. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
113. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 97.
115. See supra notes 93, 95 and accompanying text.
116. See Shaman, supra note 5.
117. See supra note 37.
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absent plaintiffs, Shutts in effect provides the absent plaintiffs with an
additional "representative"-the defendant.
Acknowledging that the concerns of out-of-state defendants are dif-
ferent from those of absent class plaintiffs, the Court held that due pro-
cess affords the former more protection than it does the latter.11 The
next logical step is to apply this approach within the framework of com-
mon question class actions. The concerns of absent class plaintiffs vary
with the nature of the case, and the due process protections required in a
given case should be designed to respond to those varying concerns. A
mandatory individual notice requirement does not respond to these dif-
fering needs.
An example using the federal rule illustrates the inappropriateness
of a uniform notice standard for all common question class actions.
Under the federal rule, and the majority of the state rules, a mass tort
class action and a consumer class action could be certified under the
same subdivision." 9 It is apparent that the interests of the class mem-
bers in these two cases will be substantially different. The plaintiff in the
tort action generally is aware of her claim. The potential of a substantial
judgment and the practice of contingency fees provides such a plaintiff
access to counsel, and she has a potentially greater loss if her claim is
foreclosed by an adverse class judgment. On the other hand, the con-
sumer victim may well be unaware that she has a cause of action. Finan-
cial barriers may effectively preclude her from litigating a claim of which
she is aware, and she usually has a smaller potential for loss if her claim
is foreclosed by res judicata.
Individual notice in the tort action may be practicable, and consid-
ering the enhanced interests of the class members, desirable. Individual
notice in the consumer action may be both impracticable and unneces-
sary because selective notice will likely produce any legitimate objections
which would be raised. To contend that due process requires the same
level of notice in both situations contradicts the concept that due process
molds to the perceived needs of the parties in a given situation.
Moreover, the individual notice requirement, as it exists in the fed-
eral courts, is more untenable because class representatives merely strive
to certify their suits pursuant to categories in which notice is discretion-
ary.'20 Artful pleading enables the tort action to fall within a limited
118. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (common question subdivision). For a discussion of mass
tort claims filed pursuant to the (b)(3) classification, see 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra
note 52, at § 1783 n.9; see also Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions: "Playing Fair"
With National Classes, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1487, 1503 n.80 (1984).
120. E.g., Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1171 (1983) (Defendant A.H. Robbins Co. attempted to certify a class pursuant to the
(b)(1)(B) limited fund subdivision for the outstanding claims arising from the use of its Dalkon
Shield IUD. The Ninth Circuit refused to certify the class, finding that Robbins failed to
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fund classification-where notice is discretionary-but there are no legit-
imate arguments which enable a consumer action to avoid the common
question classification. Thus, under the rules as they presently exist, the
consumer action is in effect barred from the federal courts; yet the mass
tort action may proceed, possibly with no notice whatsoever. An individ-
ual notice requirement in common question class actions, while purport-
edly protecting the interests of the absent class plaintiffs, effectively
discriminates against many meritorious actions by foreclosing them from
the federal courts.'21
The argument for a flexible notice requirement does not advocate
dispensing with individual notice where it is practicable and desirable.'22
However, a mandatory individual notice requirement does not always
protect the interests of the absent class plaintiffs. Their interests are best
protected by focusing on the adequacy of representation. This focus en-
sures that their interests are not foreclosed without due process because
an absent member can attack the judgment if she can establish that the
representatives failed to protect her interests. 123 By contrast, receipt of
notice and failure to opt out can have the effect of foreclosing an absent
party's claim regardless of the adequacy of the representation. 124
Undoubtedly individual notice informs many absent class plaintiffs
of their rights, but reliance on such notice as a principal due process
safeguard is misplaced. Legal notices are generally mysterious-if not
incomprehensible-to the average citizen, 125 and contending that mere
receipt of notice protects a potential litigant's interests defies common
experience. Indeed, there are cases in which receipt of notice clearly
failed to inform the parties of the pendency of the action or of their
prove the existence of a limited fund); see also 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 52,
at § 1779.
121. Maintenance of consumer class actions in the federal courts was effectively curtailed
by the decision of Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), where the Court held
that each class. plaintiff's claim must meet the $ 10,000 jurisdictional amount to satisfy diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although Zahn limited the use of the federal courts in diversity
cases, classes maintained under federal question jurisdiction are allowed and some consumer
class actions qualify. See, eg., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (claims
arising from violations of the federal security laws). The Eisen individual notice requirement
effectively precludes many of those suits, which shifted many multistate class actions to the
state courts. See Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. Cr. REV. 97, 99 (sug-
gesting that the true reason for the Eisen decision was to ease the caseload of the federal courts
by forcing class suits into the state courts).
122. See, e.g., McCall, supra note 4 (advocating a balancing approach between the state's
interest in redressing consumer grievances and the obstacles of individual notice).
123. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 68.
125. See generally T. BARTSH, F. BODDY, B. KING & P. THOMPSON, A CLASS-ACTION
Surr THAT WORKED 101-118 (1978), for a discussion of various types of notice, including
comparisons on the relative effectiveness of individual notice and media notice.
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Conclusion
Prejudgment notice in class actions can be an integral aspect of the
protections afforded absent class plaintiffs. To serve its purposes, how-
ever, the notice should be designed to protect the interests of the absent
class members by giving them the opportunity to assist the court in de-
termining whether the class representatives will adequately represent
their interests. The interests of class plaintiffs are not protected when
redress of their claims is precluded altogether because a prejudgment no-
tice requirement is prohibitively expensive. The better approach is for
the court to design a notice scheme tailored to the facts of each case.
Shutts furthered this approach by refusing to apply a clearly inappropri-
ate safeguard-minimum contacts. It is for the state courts to continue
this approach.
The forum court should first determine the likelihood of relitigation
by absent class plaintiffs, and then formulate a notice scheme which is
likely to inform as many of the absent parties as possible. The interests
of the absent parties will be protected, the defendant will be assured of a
binding judgment, and the class action device will continue to function as
a viable means for redressing multiparty complaints. With this ap-
proach, the courts will have effectively tamed a beneficial beast and laid
Justice Holmes' fears to rest.
By Bob Wenbourne*
126. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 321-22 (1973):
The sad truth is that notices issued by courts or attorneys are much too larded with
legal jargon to be understood by the average citizen.
A good illustration of this also is offered by the tetracycline cases. The Attorney
General of North Carolina sent notice of the action to citizens .... Some of the
responses are worth reading ....
Dear Mr. Clerk: I have your notice that I owe you $300 for selling drugs. I
have never sold any drugs, especially those you have listed; but I have sold a little
whiskey once in a while.
Dear Sir: I received your pamphlet on drugs, which I think will be of great
value to me in the future. I am unable to attend your class, however.
Id. at 322.
* B.A., La Verne College, 1975; Member, third year class.
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